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ABSTRACT
It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial
examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks
operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we
argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncer-
tainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the func-
tional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training
protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network,
which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error
having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversar-
ial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets
(MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-
art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks
trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Mo-
tivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on
adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on
adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with rein-
forcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our
resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to
previous attempts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has significantly improved the state-of-the-art in a variety of scientific and en-
gineering fields, from speech recognition (Mikolov et al., 2011; Hinton et al., 2012) to computer
vision (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Szegedy et al., 2015), and has provided novel insights in well-
established fields such as condensed matter physics (Cubuk et al., 2015; Schoenholz et al., 2016a).
An intriguing aspect of deep learning models in computer vision is that while they can classify im-
ages with high accuracy, they fail catastrophically when those same images are perturbed slightly
in an adversarial fashion (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). The prevalence of ad-
versarial examples presents challenges to our understanding of how deep networks generalize and
pose security risks in real world applications (Papernot et al., 2016a; Kurakin et al., 2016a). Several
techniques have been proposed to defend against adversarial examples. Adversarial training (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) augments the training data with adversarial examples. It has been shown that
using stronger adversarial attacks in adversarial training can increase the robustness to stronger at-
tacks, but at the cost of a decrease in clean accuracy (i.e. accuracy on samples that have not been
adversarially perturbed) (Madry et al., 2017). Defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b), feature
squeezing (Xu et al., 2017), and Parseval training (Cisse et al., 2017) have also been shown to make
models more robust against adversarial attacks.
The goal of this work is to study the common properties of adversarial examples. We calculate
the adversarial error, defined as the difference between clean accuracy and adversarial accuracy at a
given size of adversarial perturbation (). Surprisingly, adversarial error has a similar dependence on
small values of  for all network models and datasets we studied, including linear, fully-connected,
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simple convolutional networks, Inception v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016), Inception-ResNet v2, Incep-
tion v4 (Szegedy et al., 2017), ResNet v1, ResNet v2 (He et al., 2016), NasNet-A (Zoph & Le,
2016; Zoph et al., 2017), adversarially trained Inception v3 and Inception-ResNet v2 (Kurakin et al.,
2016b), and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels of MNIST. Adversarial error due to the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), its L2-norm variant, and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
attack grows as a power-law like AB with B between 0.9 and 1.3. By contrast, we find that ad-
versarial error caused by one-step least likely class method (step l.l.) also scales as a power-law
where B is between 1.8 and 2.5 for small . This observed universality points to a mysterious com-
monality between these models and datasets, despite the different number of channels, pixels, and
classes present. Adversarial error caused by FGSM on the training set of randomly shuffled labels
of MNIST (LeCun & Cortes) also has the power-law form where B = 1.2, which implies that the
universality is not a result of the specific content of these datasets nor the ability of the model to
generalize.
To discover the mechanism behind this universality we show how, at small , the success of an
adversarial attack depends on the input-logit Jacobian of the model and on the logits of the network.
We demonstrate that the susceptibility of a model to FGSM and PGD attacks is in large part dictated
by the cumulative distribution of the difference between the most likely logit and the second most
likely logit. We observe that this cumulative distribution has a universal form among all datasets
and models studied, including randomly produced data. Together, we believe these results provide
a compelling story regarding the susceptibility of machine learning models to adversarial examples
at small .
Our results suggest that there may be two distinct mechanisms for adversarial error at small and
large  respectively. At small , most adversarial examples change the prediction to the second
largest logit of the network; in this regime the adversarial error scales as a power-law with a similar
exponent regardless of model and dataset. By contrast, at larger , the adversarial error plateaus
and becomes insensitive to . Supporting evidence for this claim of two distinct mechanisms for
adversarial errors can be found in recent work by Papernot et al. (2017). Papernot et al. (2017)
observe that defenses that are effective against small  attacks merely perform gradient masking and
are not effective against black-box attacks at the same . In contrast, defenses that are effective at
larger  values are also robust against black-box attacks. In light of these results, care must be taken
when developing techniques to make models robust to adversarial attacks. Indeed,
We show that training with single-step adversarial examples offers protection against large  attacks
(between 0.2 and 32), but does not help appreciably at defending against small  attacks (below 0.2).
At  = 0.2, all ImageNet models we studied incur 10 to 25% adversarial error, and surprisingly,
vanilla NASNet-A (best clean accuracy in our study) has a lower adversarial error than adversarially
trained Inception-ResNet v2 or Inception v3 (Kurakin et al., 2016b) (Fig. 1(a)). In light of these
results, we explore a different avenue to adversarial robustness through architecture selection. We
perform neural architecture search (NAS) using reinforcement learning (Zoph & Le, 2016; Zoph
et al., 2017). These techniques allow us to find several architectures that are especially robust to ad-
versarial perturbations. In addition, by analyzing the adversarial robustness of the tens-of-thousands
of architectures constructed by NAS, we gain insights into the relationship between size of a model,
its clean accuracy, and its adversarial robustness. In summary, the key contributions of our work are:
• We study the functional form of adversarial error and logit differences across several mod-
els and datasets, which turn out to be universal. We analytically derive the commonality in
the power-law tails of the logit differences, and show how it leads to the commonality in
the form of adversarial error.
• We observe that although the qualitative form of logit differences and adversarial error is
universal, it can be quantitatively improved with entropy regularization and better network
architectures.
• We study the dependence of adversarial robustness on the network architecture via NAS.
We show that while adversarial accuracy is strongly correlated with clean accuracy, it is
only weakly correlated with model size. Our work leads to architectures that are more
robust to white-box and black-box attacks on CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) than
previous studies.
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2 SURPRISING UNIVERSALITY OF ADVERSARIAL ERROR AT SMALL 
FGSM computes adversarial examples as:
xadv = x+  sign (∇xL(x, y)) , (1)
where x is the clean image, y is the correct label for that image, xadv is the adversarial image,  is
the size of the adversarial perturbation, and L(x, y) is the loss function.  values are specified in
range [0,255]. We only study white-box attacks in this section.
We begin with a preliminary examination of the architectural dependence of adversarial robustness.
To that end, in Fig. 1 (a) we plot the test set adversarial error due to an FGSM attack as a function
of  for several models on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015). We note that for  < 0.2, the
adversarial error follows a power law form with an exponent between 0.9 and 1.1 for all models
studied. Even adversarially trained models Kurakin et al. (2016b), while adversarially much more
robust for larger values of , follow a similar form and reach as large as 20% adversarial error at
smaller .
In light of the surprising commonality in adversarial error at small-, we investigate whether there
is any way to get a different form for the adversarial error. To do this, we evaluate the adversarial
error due to step l.l. attack, which is computed as:
xadv = x−  sign (∇xL(x, yl.l.)) , (2)
where yl.l. is least likely class predicted by the network on clean image x (Kurakin et al., 2016b).
The adversarial error also follows a power law, however with a larger exponent. The exponents
range from 1.8 to 2.2 for ImageNet models (Fig. 1(b)), and 1.8 to 2.5 for models trained on MNIST
(Fig. 2(c)) and CIFAR10. Thus, we see that attack protocol can change the exponent of the observed
power-law.
Figure 1: Test set adversarial error as a function of  for models trained on ImageNet due to FGSM
and step l.l. attack in (a) and (b), respectively. adv. tr. denotes models that are adversarially
trained (Kurakin et al., 2016b). In (b), we also show two of the power law fits with straight lines.
To test the limits of the universality observed in Fig. 1, we perform a number of more extensive
tests. First, we investigate the effect of architecture by stochastically sampling thousands of different
neural networks and train them on MNIST. We then measure their adversarial error due to FGSM
on the test set. The architectures we sample are either fully-connected networks with 1-4 hidden
layers and 30-2000 hidden nodes in each layer, or simple convolutional networks with dropout rates
between 0-0.5. The adversarial error of representative linear, fully-connected, and convolutional
networks are shown in Fig. 2 (a). As above, these models all have the same form of adversarial error
with a powerlaw dependence on  with exponents between 0.9 and 1.2.
See Fig. 10 in the Appendix for a plot with all of the generated networks. We perform the same
analysis on a 32-layer ResNet trained on CIFAR10 (He et al., 2016), which achieves a 92.6% clean
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accuracy on the test set. The result is shown in Appendix Fig. 11, where the adversarial error follows
a power law with an exponent of 0.99 up to an  of 1.
Next, we probe the relationship between generalization and adversarial robustness following a sim-
ilar approach to Zhang et al. (2016). In particular, we train a fully connected network on MNIST
with shuffled labels until it reaches perfect accuracy on the training set. The adversarial error on the
training set is shown in Fig. 2(b). Once again we see that the adversarial error follows an almost
identical power-law form at small  with an exponent of 1.2.
Figure 2: Points represent adversarial error as a function of  for models trained on MNIST. Straight
lines are power-law fits. (a) FGSM attack on fully-connected 3-layer network (FC), a linear model,
and a convolutional network (b) FGSM attack on FC trained on randomly shuffled labels (evaluated
on the training set). (c) Different attacks on FC.
Finally, we further investigate the dependence of adversarial robustness on attack protocol. We
plot in Fig. 2 (c) the adversarial error on MNIST with an L∞-normalized FGSM attack, an L2-
normalized FGSM attack, and a 20-step projected gradient descent (PGD) attack (Madry et al.,
2017). We see that despite the anomalous exponent observed for step-l.l. attacks, the other attack
methods display the same universality with exponents of 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 for L2-norm, FGSM, and
PGD attacks, respectively. step-l.l. attack on MNIST has an exponent of 2.3.
3 A MEAN-FIELD THEORY OF ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS
3.1 LINEAR RESPONSE
We now offer a theoretical explanation for the observed universal behavior of adversarial error.
The breadth of these observations shows that adversarial error for small adversarial perturbations
does not depend on the specifics of the neural network, which implies that we can understand the
small  regime by making simplifying approximations. We begin by considering the linear response
of a neural network to adversarial perturbations. Another approach to adversarial examples that
considers the linear response of the network can be found in Nayebi & Ganguli (2017).
We will study an L2-variant of the FGSM attack. Here, the adversarial perturbation is given by,
xadv = x+ 
∇xL
||∇xL||2 (3)
instead of the more commonly used `∞ variant. As shown above, the form and exponent of adver-
sarial error is qualitatively insensitive to this choice (see Fig. 2(c)). We will now attempt to compute
the minimum , that we call ˆ(x), required before the class assigned to an input, x, changes. As-
suming the network was able to perfectly classify clean images, the adversarial error rate will then
be P (ˆ < ). While perfect classification will not be achieved in practice, the insensitivity of the
form of adversarial error to clean accuracy demonstrated above for many systems suggests that this
approximation is sound.
Notationally, we will refer to the output of the network as yˆi(x) and the corresponding logits as
hi(x). The class prediction of the network will then be argmax(yˆ(x)) = argmax(h(x)). For
simplicity we will choose an ordering of the logits such that h1(x) ≥ h2(x) ≥ · · · ≥ hN (x). We
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can then enumerate a set of logit-differences, ∆ij(x) = hi(x)−hj(x). If an adversarial perturbation
is to successfully cause the network to make an erroneous prediction, then it must be true that
h1(x
adv) < hj(x
adv) for at least one j.
We calculate the response of the logits to adversarial perturbation. We consider the linearized re-
sponse of the network and find that in the limit of small  (see Appendix 6.2.1),
h(xadv) = h(x) + 
JTJδ
||Jδ||2 +O(
2) (4)
where Jij = ∂hj/∂xi is the input-logit Jacobian of the network and δi = ∂L/∂hi is the error of the
outputs of the network. For notational convenience we will define Γ(x) = JTJδ/||Jδ||2. In this
linear model we therefore predict that the logit-differences will scale as follows,
∆ij(x
adv) ≈ ∆ij(x) + (Γi(x)− Γj(x)). (5)
Recall that the adversarial perturbation will successfully cause the network to just barely misclassify
an input precisely when ∆1j(xadv) = 0 for at least one j. We can predict per-class -thresholds
beyond which the network will misclassify a given point,
ˆj(x) =
∆1j(x)
Γj(x)− Γ1(x) . (6)
Together this allows us to compute a linear approximation to ˆ given by ˆlinear(x) = minj(j(x)).
We can confirm that the change in the logits for small changes in the inputs is well-described by
this linear model. This is shown in fig. 3 (a) where we see the logits for a single example upon
Figure 3: Linear approximation for the response of the logits to adversarial perturbation. (a) The
dynamics of logits to an adversarial perturbation as a function of size  for a single training example.
Dashed lines show the linear approximation. Colors indicate the ranking of the logit from largest
(red) to smallest (blue). (b) The smallest  needed to fool the network (ˆ) for individual test examples
compared with the prediction from the linear theory. (c) Mean field prediction of ˆ.
perturbation over a range of . In particular, for small  we see an excellent agreement between
the linear approximation and the true logit dynamics. We also see that the  where the first and
second logit cross is well-approximated by the linear prediction. In Fig. 3 (b) we plot ˆlinear(x)
against ˆ(x) evaluated on every MNIST example in the test set. The white dashed line is the line
ˆ(x) = ˆlinear(x). We see that when ˆ(x) is small the ˆlinear(x) concentrate increasingly around the
ˆ(x). Together these results show that the linear response predictions are valid for small adversarial
perturbations.
While the linear model outlined above gives excellent agreement in the  → 0 limit, the Γi(x) are
themselves complicated objects (being functions of the Jacobian). This makes the analytic evalu-
ation of Eq. (6) challenging. We therefore introduce a “mean-field” approximation to Eq. (6) by
replacing Γi(x) by its average over the dataset, 〈Γi(x)〉. Similar independence approximations have
previously been successful in analyzing the expressivity and trainability of neural networks (Schoen-
holz et al., 2016b; Poole et al., 2016). Finally, we observe that the vast majority of the time (for
example, more than 95% of successful FGSM attacks for  < 50), it is ∆12(xadv) that goes to zero
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before any of the other ∆1j . We therefore assume that this will be the dominant failure mode for
neural networks and write down a mean-field estimate for ˆ,
ˆM.F. =
∆12(x)
〈Γ2〉 − 〈Γ1〉 . (7)
We show in Fig. 3 (c) that this approximation continues to be strongly correlated with ˆ. Together
these results suggest that the adversarial error rate for perturbations of size  will be
P (ˆ ≤ ) ≈ P [∆12 ≤ (〈Γ2〉 − 〈Γ1〉)] = P (∆12 ≤ ˜) (8)
where we have defined ˜ = (〈Γ2〉 − 〈Γ1〉) to be a network-specific rescaling of . We therefore
expect the adversarial error rate at small  to be dictated by the cumulative distribution of ∆12 for
attacks that effectively target the second most likely class (e.g. FGSM, PGD ...etc.).
3.2 UNIVERSAL PROPERTIES OF THE LOGIT DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION
With the results from the preceding section in hand, we now investigate the distribution of logit
differences, P (∆1j). Since we are particularly interested in the small  regime, we seek to compute
P (∆1j) for small ∆1j . To make progress we will again make a mean field approximation and
assume that each of the logits are i.i.d. with arbitrary distribution. With this approximation we find
that for small ∆1j (see Appendix 6.2.2),
P (∆1j) = C∆
j−2
1j +O(∆j−11j ) (9)
where C is a network specific constant. An interesting consequence of this result is that the differ-
ence that we are particularly interested in, P (∆12), scales as O(1) as ∆12 → 0. This implies that,
generically, we expect the most likely logit and second most likely logit to have a finite probability
of being arbitrarily close together. We interpret this as an inherent uncertainty in the predictions of
neural networks.
While it is not obvious that the assumption of a factorial logit distribution is valid here, we will see
that Eq. (9) captures the universal features of the distribution at small values of the logit difference.
Indeed, from the previous section we see that the form of Eq. (9) implies that the adversarial error
rate should scale as follows
P (ˆ < ) ≈ P (∆12 < ˜) ≈ C˜+O(˜2) (10)
as was broadly observed in the previous section.
To further test whether or not the mean field approximation is valid, we evaluate ∆1j for a number of
different neural network architectures and datasets. We find that on all datasets and models studied,
the ∆1j distributions have power-law tails. As predicted, ∆12 has a power-law tail with an exponent
of about 0, and ∆1j for j > 2 have power-law tails with positive exponents increasing with j.
We note, however, that the powers are typically not integral for large j. It seems likely that this
breakdown is the result of correlations between the logits. In Fig. 4, we compare distribution of ∆1j
with j = 2, 3, 4 for ImageNet and logits that are independently sampled from a uniform distribution
for 5 million samples with 10 classes. In Fig. 6 we see similar results for MNIST. Together these
results verify our predictions over a vast set of networks and datasets.
The empirical results above show that adversarial error has a power-law form for well-studied and
random datasets, simple full connected networks as well as complicated state-of-the-art models. It
follows that the prevalence and commonality of adversarial examples is not due to the depth of the
model (for example, see the linear model in Fig. 2 (a)), or the high-dimensionality of the datasets.
Rather, they are due to the fact that lots of examples have small ∆12 values. This makes it easy to
find examples to fool the model at test-time.
It is interesting that the distribution of ∆1j , at small ∆1j , for trained models is essentially identical
to that of i.i.d. random logits (especially for j = 2). This suggests that while our training procedures
are good at modifying the largest logit in a way that leads to good clean accuracies, these procedures
do not induce strong enough correlations between the logits to disrupt the essential scaling uncovered
above. This problem is reminiscent of the problem distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) attempts to
solve, by incorporating information about ratios of incorrect classes. This might be one of the
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Figure 4: (a) Distribution of ∆1j of NASNet-A trained on ImageNet. (b) Distribution of ∆1j for
logits that are sampled independently from a uniform random distribution for 5 million samples with
10 classes. ∆1N of other models are in Appendix Fig. 13
reasons defensive distillation improves adversarial robustness. It would be interesting to study the
distributions of logit differences during training of distillation networks.
Given the large density of small ∆12 values, we study an entropy penalty regularizer to make models
more robust. Our proposed loss function can be written as: loss = old loss − λ ∑ni=1 pi log pi.
where λ is a hyperparameter, n is the number of classes, and pi are the outputs of the neural network.
This regularization term has been used by Miyato et al. (2017) for semi-supervised learning tasks.
It aims to increase the confidence of the network on each sample, which is the opposite of previous
regularization attempts that penalized confidence to increase generalization accuracy (Pereyra et al.,
2017; Szegedy et al., 2015). By penalizing the entropy of the softmax outputs, we aim to increase
the logit differences.
In Fig. 5, we show that entropy regularization with a λ = 4.5 increases the adversarial robustness
both for regularly trained networks and step l.l. adversarially trained networks, and both for permu-
tation invariant and regular MNIST. We note that the same qualitative results hold for other values
of λ we tried. Despite the increase in adversarial accuracy, the permutation invariant MNIST model
has 0.8% lower clean accuracy when trained with the entropy penalty. In Appendix Fig. 12, we
show that a wide ResNet trained with the entropy regularizer has improved robustness with no loss
in clean accuracy.
Figure 5: Step l.l. attack adversarial accuracy as a function of  for CNN (a) and permutation
invariant (b) MNIST, with regular training (purple), with entropy regularization (red), adversarial
training (green), and adversarial training with entropy regularization (blue). Adversarial training
was done using the step l.l. method. In (c), we show the PGD attack adversarial accuracy on
permutation invariant MNIST trained with and without step l.l. adversarial training.
We investigate whether the increased adversarial robustness is due to increased logit differences.
In Fig. 6, we plot the distribution of ∆1j for j up to 4, for two networks trained on permutation
invariant MNIST, with and without entropy regularization. As expected, margins are shifted to
larger values and density of samples with small ∆1j are reduced. The tails still follow a power-law
form with the same exponents, however there are fewer samples with small margins compared to a
regularly trained network. Although entropy regularization made our networks white-box attacks, it
did not lead to a significant improvement against black-box attacks. For this reason, we focus on the
influence of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity below.
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Figure 6: Distribution of ∆1j up to j = 5 for permutation invariant MNIST trained with and without
entropy regularization in red and purple, respectively.
4 ROLE OF NETWORK ARCHITECTURES IN ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
Several recent papers observe that larger networks are more robust against adversarial examples,
regardless if they are adversarially trained or not (Kurakin et al., 2016b; Madry et al., 2017). How-
ever, it is not clear if network architectures play an important role in adversarial robustness. Are
larger models more robust because they have more trainable parameters, or simply because they
have higher clean accuracy? Is it possible to find more robust network architectures that do not
necessarily have more parameters? We run several experiments to answer these questions, as well
as to find an adversarially more robust model on CIFAR10. We perform neural architecture search
(NAS) with reinforcement learning. Our search space and procedure are almost exactly the same as
in Zoph et al. (2017). One difference is that we restrict the search space so that the normal cell must
be the same as the reduction cell. This reduces the complexity of the search space as now we have
only half as many predictions. Finally, we increase the number of prediction steps from 5 to 7 to
slightly gain back the complexity that was lost when we restricted the normal cell to be equal to the
reduction cell.
We carry out two experiments:
• Experiment 1: NAS where child models are trained with clean and step l.l. adversarial
examples and the reward is computed on the validation set with FGSM adversarial accuracy
at  = 8.
• Experiment 2: NAS where child models are trained with clean and PGD adversarial exam-
ples and the reward is computed on the validation set with FGSM adversarial accuracy at
 = 8.
In both experiments, child models are trained for 10 epochs on a training set of 25 thousand samples.
Child models are trained on mini-batches where half of the samples are adversarially perturbed,
following the procedure in (Kurakin et al., 2016b). At the end of each experiment, we pick the
child model with the highest FGSM adversarial accuracy at  = 8 on the validation set of 5000
samples, and scale up the number of filters. We train the enlarged models for 100 epochs on the
full training set of 45000 samples for 12 different hyperparameter sets, and pick the one with the
highest adversarial accuracy on the validation set. Finally, we report below the performance of these
models on a held-out test set of 10 thousand samples. To provide a comparison with the results of
our two experiments, we also run a vanilla NAS where the reward is clean validation accuracy. We
will refer to the best architecture from vanilla NAS as NAS Baseline. When trained using the setup
above only on clean examples, NAS Baseline reaches a test set accuracy of 95.3%.
We present the results of Experiment 1 in Fig 7(a). Here the green curve is the adversarial accuracy
NAS Baseline. The blue curve is the adversarial accuracy of a network architecture that was found by
Experiment 1. Both of these architectures are trained with the same adversarial training procedure.
We try the same sets of hyperparameters and report here the models with best adversarial accuracy at
 = 8 on the validation set. Adversarial training reduced the clean accuracy by 0.2%. Adversarially
trained models both have clean accuracy of 95.1% on the test set, whereas the model that was trained
without adversarial training reached 95.3% accuracy.
We next use PGD adversarial examples in the training of child models, to find architectures that are
more robust to any adversarial attack within an  ball (Madry et al., 2017). Following the training
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Figure 7: (a) step l.l. adversarial accuracy of NAS Baseline trained with and without step l.l. adver-
sarial examples in green and red, respectively. Best model from Experiment 1 is shown in blue. (b)
PGD adversarial accuracy of NAS Baseline trained with and without PGD adversarial examples in
green and red, respectively. Best model from Experiment 2 is shown in blue.
White-box Black-box
Clean FGSM step l.l. PGD FGSM step l.l. PGD
Madry et al. (2017) 87.3% 56.1% - 50.0% 67.0 % - 64.2%
This work 93.2% 63.6% 77.9% 50.1% 78.1 % 84.9% 75.0%
Table 1: Performance of our best architecture from Experiment 2 at  = 8. Black-box attacks are
sourced from a copy of the network independently initialized and trained.
procedure by Madry et al. (2017), we use 7 steps of size 2, for a total  = 8. We present the
results of Experiment 2 in Fig. 7(b). As was the case in Experiment 1, the architecture found by
adversarial NAS leads to a more robust model. At  = 8, the architecture from Experiment 2
reaches a 17% higher adversarial accuracy on PGD examples. We compare our results to the results
by Madry et al. (2017). Madry et al. (2017) trained only on PGD examples, whereas half of our
minibatches are clean examples. Despite this, we match their accuracy on white-box PGD attacks.
Against other white- and black-box attacks our model is more robust, and our clean accuracy is
5.9% higher. We also note that NAS Baseline model has 4.9 million trainable parameters, whereas
the model from Experiments 1 and 2 have 2.3 million and 3.5 million parameters, respectively. NAS
found an adversarially more robust architecture with many fewer parameters. Best architecture from
Experiment 2 and NAS Baseline are presented in Appendix Fig. 14. Few adversarial examples
are visualized in Fig. 8 and Fig. 15 for white-box step l.l. and pgd attacks, respectively. Step l.l.
adversarial examples at  = 50 which fool our best network from Experiment 1 are so distorted that
even humans would have trouble classifying them.
Finally, we study the performance statistics of child models during NAS. In Fig. 9, we report the
results for 9360 child models that were trained during Experiment 1. As explained above, these
models are only trained for 10 epochs. In Fig. 9(a), we see that the correlation between adversarialy
accuracy and the number of trainable parameters of the model is not very strong. On the other hand,
adversarial accuracy is strongly correlated with clean accuracy (Fig. 9(b)). We hypothesize that this
is the reason both Madry et al. (2017) and Kurakin et al. (2016b) found that making networks larger
increased adversarial robustness, because it also increased the clean accuracy. This implies that
commonly used architectures, like Inception v3 and ResNet, benefit from having more parameters.
This however was not the case for most child models during NAS. On the other hand, having a
high clean accuracy is not sufficient for adversarial robustness. As seen in Fig. 9(c), there is a large
variance in the adversarial accuracy of models with good clean accuracy. The range of adversarial
accuracies in the histogram of models with larger than 85% clean accuracy is 22% and the standard
deviation is 2.6%. For this reason, our experiments led to adversarially more robust architectures
than NAS Baseline while having the same clean accuracy.
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Exp. 1 Exp. 1 NAS Baseline
Figure 8: Adversarial examples for white-box step l.l. attack at  = 50. Left column shows ad-
versarial examples that fooled our best network from Experiment 1, whereas middle column shows
adversarial examples that could not. Right column shows the performance of NAS Baseline on the
adversarial images created from the same clean images in the middle column. At this  value, best
network from Exp. 1 and NAS Baseline have step l.l. adversarial accuracies of 51.8% and 26.4%,
respectively. Images are chosen randomly for each category.
Figure 9: Performance of child models on the validation set. FGSM adversarial accuracy at  = 8 vs.
number of trainable parameters and clean accuracy in (a) and (b), respectively. Black dots represent
each child model, purple line is a running average. Figure (c) is the histogram of the adversarial
accuracy for models with clean accuracy larger than 85%.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied common properties of adversarial examples across different models and
datasets. We theoretically derived a universality in logit differences and adversarial error of machine
learning models. We showed that architecture plays an important role in adversarial robustness,
which correlates strongly with clean accuracy.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 FURTHER EXPERIMENTS
Figure 10: Adversarial error for hundreds of models trained on MNIST, including fully-connected
and convolutional models. We only show models with clean accuracy larger than 80%.
Figure 11: Points represent the adversarial error due to FGSM as a function of  for a 32-layer
ResNet trained on CIFAR10. Straight line is a power law fit with an exponent of 0.99.
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Figure 12: Effect of adding an entropy regularization (λ = 3.0): step l.l. adversarial accuracy
of wide ResNet on CIFAR10, with and without entropy regularization. Both models have a clean
accuracy of 94%. They were both trained for 100 epochs with the same hyperparameters.
Figure 13: (a) Distribution of ∆1N for other ImageNet models.
6.2 DERIVATIONS
Here we derive several of the results found in the main text.
6.2.1 LINEAR RESPONSE
First, we compute the linear response of the network to the L2 FGSM attack. Let, f : RN → RM
be a neural network (or other model) structured such that f = softmax ◦ h where h : RN → RM
maps inputs to logits. Additionally define a loss L : RM → R which can be cross-entropy, L2, etc..
To generate adversarial examples we start with an input x ∈ RN and a corresponding target t ∈ RM
such that tβ = 1 if β = γ for some γ and tβ = 0 otherwise. We assume our network gets the answer
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correct so that hγ > hβ for all β 6= γ. Then we apply the adversarial perturbation,
x′α = xα + 
∇xL
||∇xL||2 . (11)
Note that we can write
∇xL = ∂L
∂xα
=
∑
β
∂hβ
∂xα
∂L
∂hβ
=
∑
β
Jαβ
∂L
∂hβ
= Jδ. (12)
Where we associate Jαβ = ∂hβ/∂xα with the input-to-logit Jacobian linking the inputs to the logits
and δ = ∂L/∂hβ the error of the outputs of the network.
We can compute the change to the logits of the network due to this perturbation. We find,
h(x′) = h(x+ ∇xL/||∇xL||2) (13)
h′β ≈ hβ +

||∇xL||2
∑
α
∂hβ
∂xα
∂L
∂xα
+O(2) (14)
= hβ +

||∇xL||2
∑
αδ
∂hβ
∂xα
∂hδ
∂xα
∂L
∂hδ
(15)
where we have plugged in for eq. (11). Expressing the above equation in terms of the Jacobian, it
follows that we can write the effect of the adversarial perturbation on the logits by,
h′ = h+ 
JTJδ
||Jδ||2 (16)
as postulated.
6.2.2 UNIVERSAL PROPERTIES OF THE LOGIT DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION
We now show that
P (∆1j) = C∆
j−2
1j +O(∆j−11j ). (17)
To make progress we will again make a mean field approximation and assume that each of the logits
are i.i.d. with arbitrary distribution P (h). We denote the cumulative distribution F (h). While it is
not obvious that the factorial approximation is valid here, we will see that the resulting distribution
of P (∆1j) shares many qualitative similarities with the distribution observed in real networks.
We first change variables from the logits to a sorted version of the logits, ri. The ranked logits are
defined such that r1 = max({hi}), r2 = max({hi}\{r1}), · · · . Our first result is to compute the
resulting joint distribution between r1 and rj ,
Pj(r1, rj) = A(N, j)F
N−j(rj) [F (r1)− F (rj)]j−2 P (rj)P (r1) (18)
where A(N, j) = N(N − 1)(N−2j−2 ) is a combinatorial factor. Eq. (18) has a simple interpretation.
FN−j(rj) is the probability that there are N − j variables less than rj ; [F (r1)− F (rj)]j−2 is the
probability that j − 2 variables are between rj and r1; P (rj)P (r1) is the probability that there is
one variable equal to each of r1 and rj . The combinatorial factor can be understood since there are
N ways of selecting r1, N − 1 ways of selecting rj , and
(
N−2
j−2
)
ways of choosing j − 2 variables
out of the remaining N − 2 to be between rj and r1.
In terms of eq. (18) we can compute the distribution over ∆1j to be given by,
P (∆1j) =
∫
drPj(r + ∆1j , r) (19)
= A(N, j)
∫
drFN−j(r) [F (r + ∆1j)− F (r)]j−2 P (r)P (r + ∆1j). (20)
We can analyze this equation for small ∆1j . Expanding to lowest order in ∆1j ,
P (∆1j) = A(N, j)∆
j−2
1j
∫
drFN−j(r)P j(r) +O(∆j−11j ). (21)
Since the term in the integral does not depend on ∆1j the result follows with,
C = N(N − 1)
(
N − 2
j − 2
)∫
drFN−j(r)P j(r). (22)
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6.2.3 ARCHITECTURES
Figure 14: Left: Best architecture from Experiment 1. Right: Architecture of NAS Baseline. We
note that the architecture from Experiment 1 is “longer” and “narrower” than previous architectures
found by NAS for higher clean accuracy (Zoph & Le, 2016; Zoph et al., 2017).
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6.2.4 PGD ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Figure 15: Adversarial examples for white-box PGD attack at  = 8. These are examples that fooled
our best network from Experiment 2.
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